

ROUTING

Top Secret

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE

Thursday 9 November 1978 CG NIDC 78/262



NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

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National Intelligence Daily Cable for Thursday, 9 November 1978.

The NID Cable is for the purpose of informing senior US officials.

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IRAN: Political Situation Report

25X1 [redacted] //Tehran continues to be calm as troops from outlying garrisons in Iran patrol the streets. Iran's military leaders are more confident of the dependability of the Army rank and file following the adverse reaction by the troops to the widespread destruction caused by the rioters.

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25X1	[redacted]
25X1	[redacted]
25X1	[redacted]
25X1	[redacted]
25X1	[redacted]
25X1	[redacted]
25X1	[redacted]
25X1	[redacted]



USSR-IRAN: Political Relationship

25X1 [] Neither the USSR nor any other foreign power appears to be fomenting or encouraging the current disturbances in Iran. The Soviets, nevertheless, are now acknowledging publicly that the Shah's position has become precarious and are becoming somewhat more sympathetic toward the demonstrators.

25X1 [] The Soviets probably would not serve their interests by becoming actively involved against the Shah. Antagonizing the Iranian leadership would presumably threaten considerable Soviet economic interests in Iran as well as the serviceable political relationship that exists between Iran and the USSR. Moscow's restraint thus far is particularly evident in the Soviet media's careful treatment of the Shah and his opponents as well as their infrequent replay and neutral handling of statements by Iran's outlawed Communist Party.

25X1 [] On balance, however, the USSR's public commentary suggests that it has made a reassessment of the Shah's staying power and has downgraded its appraisal of his chances of survival. Soviet media treatment of the disturbances in Iran is not nearly so circumspect as it has been during the past year. The weekly *Literary Gazette* has raised the prospect of a military coup, and during the past week *Pravda* treated Iran's influential leftist National Front more favorably than usual. Previous Soviet commentary has not tried to discriminate among the various groups opposing the Shah.

25X1 [] The Soviets perceive that the removal of the Shah would weaken Iran's ability to thwart Soviet objectives in the Persian Gulf and Mediterranean regions. Soviet interests, for example, would be served by Israel's increased political isolation in the area as well as a possible weakening of Oman's position in any renewal of hostilities with South Yemen--two developments which could result from the Shah's loss of power.

For these reasons, the Soviets might eventually be tempted to assist dissidents in Iran if they perceived that the Shah was in real danger of being overthrown. The USSR's primary concern in such an event would be to try to make certain that the Shah was replaced by a more leftist--rather than rightist--regime.

ARGENTINA: Government in Disarray

//Regardless of how Argentina deals with Chile in its efforts to negotiate a settlement of the Beagle Channel dispute, the issue has focused domestic attention on the inefficiency of President Videla's system of consensus government. Conservative military leaders, who have long criticized Videla's moderate and conciliatory style, now appear to be gaining ground at the President's expense.//

//Official embarrassment over the handling of the Beagle Channel affair has increasingly divided the Argentine Government and prevented it from deciding on its next move. Since the bilateral commission reached an impasse on 2 November, both nations have maintained their military forces in a high state of readiness. While no hostile moves have occurred in the past few days, both sides are still seriously concerned over the possibility of an armed confrontation.

//Many senior Argentine officers see the present system of government--in which Videla is supposed to share power with the military junta--as unworkable.

//The recent cabinet shuffle--in which Videla failed to make good on his promise to appoint prominent civilians to top posts--provides fresh evidence of his inability to assert his authority.

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[[redacted]] //At this point, the disarray in Buenos Aires is seriously complicating the development of a politically acceptable compromise to the Beagle Channel dispute. Even if both governments agree to further negotiations, the long-term prospects for resolution of the basic differences remain poor. [[redacted]]

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UGANDA-TANZANIA: Ending the Impasse

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[[redacted]] Ugandan President Amin has taken a first step toward ending the military impasse on the Tanzanian border. He declared to an assembly of foreign diplomats and senior Ugandan officials in Kampala yesterday that he would withdraw his forces to the recognized border if he were guaranteed that Tanzania would never again invade Uganda and would prevent Ugandan exiles in that country from engaging in subversive activities against his regime.

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[[redacted]] Amin's initiative apparently was in response to the efforts of the Organization of African Unity and several individual African countries to get the contending parties to negotiate. Amin again claimed that Uganda had been forced to seek a secure natural boundary along the Kagera River because Tanzania has encouraged and assisted Ugandan exiles to engage in subversive activities in Uganda.

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[[redacted]] Tanzanian President Nyerere apparently believes the international community, which in the past has vilified Amin on moral and humane grounds, supports his condemnation of the

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Ugandan President's actions and will help redress Tanzania's grievances. Amin's conditions for withdrawal are likely to be unacceptable to Dar es Salaam at this time, but his offer may encourage further diplomatic efforts to end the current contention. [REDACTED]

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LIBYA: Economic Aid to LDCs

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[REDACTED] *//Libya is significantly increasing its economic aid to developing countries both to advance its foreign political aims and to meet domestic economic needs. Libya's disbursements to Third World governments and multilateral aid institutions will rise to about \$300 million this year from about \$130 million in 1976 and just under \$200 million in 1977. This increase in aid will place Libya fourth among aid donors from the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries.//*

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[REDACTED] *//The Libyans continue to give much of their economic assistance to revolutionary and socialist countries with whom Tripoli feels an ideological affinity. Included in this group are Angola, Congo, Ethiopia, Guinea, South Yemen, and Syria.//*

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[REDACTED] *Libya also has supplied considerable amounts of aid to a select group of developing countries in order to expand its political influence--sometimes at the expense of Western interests--or to facilitate its economic development.*

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[REDACTED] *//Libya's efforts to buy political influence have frequently been poorly conceived and therefore unsuccessful. Its courtship of the "progressive" government of Ethiopia, for example, earned it the unwanted label of Soviet surrogate*

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in the Ethiopian-Somalia dispute and put the Libyans in the awkward position of undermining fellow Muslims in Ethiopia's Eritrea Province.

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